INTRODUCTION
The debate on whether a central bank should have a rule to set its policy instruments or alternatively to conduct monetary policy with discretion has heated up in recent years with proposed legislation in Congress, which has been passed by the House, to require the Federal Reserve to report on a "directive" rule similar to a Taylor (1993) rule for its policy instruments.
In this paper, I discuss where I think the rules versus discretion debate is currently and argue that in a sense, this debate has been miscast, because a central bank does not have to choose only between adopting a policy rule versus pure discretion. Instead it can choose to adopt a discretionary regime that has rule-like attributes, a regime that Ben Bernanke and I referred to as "constrained discretion" in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) . However, how can be discretion be constrained so it avoids the disadvantages of pure discretion? The answer I provide here is that monetary policy discretion can be made more rule-like by pursuing monetary policy communication that not only constrains discretion, but also has additional benefits in enabling the markets to respond to shocks to the economy so both inflation and output are stabilized. 
THE RULES VERSUS DISCRETION DEBATE
First, let's define our terms. A rule requires that monetary policy is essentially automatic: it involves a precise prescription for how monetary policy should react to a set of economic circumstances. One example of a monetary policy rule is the constant-money-growth rule advocated by Milton Friedman, in which the money supply is set by the central bank to grow at a constant rate. A more recent alternative is the classic Taylor (1993) rule in which the policy interest rate, the federal funds rate, is set to be a weighted average of an output gap (actual output minus potential output) and an inflation gap (actual inflation minus the target inflation rate.) The polar opposite of a monetary policy rule, according to the traditional classification of policy regimes is based on discretion. Discretion, in its purist form, involves monetary policymakers setting their policy instruments on a day-to-day basis as economic events unfold, with no public commitments about its objectives or actions.
The Case for Rules
There are two basic arguments for monetary policy rules. First is that monetary policy makers making discretionary decisions cannot be trusted. In their classic study of monetary policy history, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) document many instances where Federal Reserve policies led to sharp contractions in economic activity, as does Meltzer (2004 Meltzer ( , 2014 . Overly expansionary monetary policy that followed the period discussed by Friedman and Schwartz and Meltzer, led The second, and I would argue more powerful, argument for monetary policy rules results from the literature on the time-inconsistency problem described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983) in the context of monetary policy. The timeinconsistency problem occurs because economic agents or policy makers always have a temptation to deviate from an optimal long-run plan, which is therefore time-inconsistent, when they operate with discretion. In other words, even when an optimal long-run plan is formulated, 4 when tomorrow comes and the economic agent or policymaker reoptimizes, they renege on the optimal plan. In the case of monetary policy, monetary policy cannot achieve higher economic growth and lower unemployment in the long run by pursuing expansionary policy to produce higher inflation. Thus in the Barro-Gordon (1983) framework, the optimal plan pursues price stability, that is, a low and stable inflation rate. However, monetary policy makers are tempted to pursue a discretionary monetary policy that tries to exploit the short-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation and so pursue more expansionary monetary policy than firms and people expect because such a policy would boost economic output and raise employment, thereby lowering unemployment in the short run. However, because there is no long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, this discretionary policy only leads to the higher inflation in the long run, while it is unsuccessful in producing lower unemployment.
Elsewhere I have criticized this argument for the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy because I do not believe that central bankers want to renege on an optimal plan to keep inflation low and stable. After all, by recognizing that there is no long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, monetary policy makers can avoid the temptation to pursue overly expansionary monetary policy. Indeed, I have argued (Mishkin, 2016) that central bankers tend to be too conservative along the lines described by Rogoff (1985) and so have a tendency to not worry sufficiently about inflation being too low. Nonetheless, I believe that the timeinconsistency problem is a serious problem for monetary policy, not because it stems from central bankers, but because politicians are short-sighted and put pressure on central bankers to pursue overly expansionary monetary policy to lower unemployment in the short run. This pressure can lead to central bankers reneging on the optimal, low inflation plan, even if they would not renege otherwise. In other words, the time-inconsistency problem arises because central banks cannot be completely insulated from political pressure (Mishkin and Westelius, 2008) .
A commitment to an instrument, monetary policy rule that embeds a nominal anchor is one way of avoiding the time-inconsistency problem. Once a monetary policy rule such as a constant-money-growth rule or a Taylor rule is adopted, monetary policy no longer can try to exploit the short-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation because as the nominal anchor of either the money supply or the target level of inflation is exceeded, monetary policy 5 automatically tightens, so that inflation is stabilized. Furthermore, the presence of a nominal anchor in an instrument rule results in an anchoring of expected inflation, which results in a a smaller tradeoff between output gaps and inflation gaps.
There can also be a time-inconsistency problem in the other direction, when the inflation rate is too low, particularly when the policy interest rate has hit the zero lower bound and this nominal interest rate cannot go below zero. This tme-inconsistency problem can be avoided bu what Woodford (2003) refers to as history-dependent policy: that is, if the central bank could commit to keep the policy rate "lower for longer," so that when a the inflation objective is reached, the policy rate would be lower than it otherwise would be to keep the inflation rate at the desired level. However, once the desired inflation rate occurs, the central bank would have a temptation to renege on this commitment and raise the policy rate to a level that is consistent with keeping the inflation rate at the desired level. An instrument rule that sets the policy rate at a lower rate when the price level is below a target path for the price level would overcome this time-inconsistency problem.
The Case for Discretion
There are five main arguments against adoption of a monetary policy, instrument rule, and so argue in favor of the conduct of monetary policy with some discretion. (Barsky, et. al., 2014 , Curdia, et. al., 2014 and Hamilton, et. al., Harris, Hatzius and West, 2015 also suggest that the natural rate of interest has fallen in recent years, and they also emphasize how uncertain estimates of the natural rate of interest are.
Research also indicates that estimates of the natural rate of unemployment are highly uncertain (Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997) is Alan Greenspan's use of judgement in the mid to late 1990s to argue against monetary policy tightening despite the rapidly growing economy and falling unemployment rate. Greenspan was able to convince the FOMC to refrain from raising rates despite recommendations from the Board's models that the FOMC do so. Greenspan was proved to be right, earning him the moniker of "maestro" (Woodward, 2000) .
Judgement, which in its nature is discretionary, is thus an essential element of monetary policy to stabilize inflation and output, as has been emphasized by Svensson (2003 Svensson ( , 2005 . But 9 how do you put judgement into an instrument rule, when judgement necessarily is based on nonquantifiable information? There is no way that I can see how this might be done and so the use of judgement in monetary policy provides another strong argument against adoption of an instrument rule.
Monetary Policymakers are Not Less Trustworthy than Rules
One argument for adoption of rules is that they are more trustworthy than policymakers.
There are certainly cases where this has been true in the past, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2004 Meltzer ( , 2014 Furthermore, the decline in GDP would have been even more severe. Indeed, the possibility of the Great Recession turning into a full-scaled depression cannot be ruled out.
Why did the Federal Reserve depart from the Taylor rule? First, the global financial crisis revealed that the standard general equilibrium models macroeconomic models used by both central banks and academic economists were unreliable because they had ignored financial disruptions as an important factor in the evolution of the economy (see Mishkin, 2011) . Second, is that the global financial crisis led to a change in the structure of the economy that made the economy more nonlinear. (However, because financial factors had not been built into general equilibrium macroeconomic models before the financial crisis, the change in structure could just be thought of as the pre-crisis macro models being misspecified.) Third, is that the financial crisis was not anticipated by macroeconomists, even those like myself who had studied financial crises in emerging market economies, but couldn't imagine that such a crisis would occur in a it had followed the Taylor rule and raised the federal funds rate by 300 basis points, instead of the around 100 basis points that they actually did.
What is the rationale for this departure from the Taylor rule? First is that the equilibrium, natural rate of interest has been falling over time, although we don't know exactly by how much, while the Taylor rule has the equilibrium rate fixed at 2%. We could either see this as a misspecification of the model or alternatively that the structure of the economy has changed, leading to a decline in the equilibrium interest rate. In addition, inflation has remained below the 2% desired level, despite very low unemployment rates. This suggests that either the model of the Phillips curve is wrong or that the estimate of the natural rate of unemployment is too high.
Stabilizing inflation and output in this environment where we are not sure what is going on requires the use of judgement.
We thus see that the objections to an instrument rule come into play again in arguing for the use of discretion in setting monetary policy in the period from late 2009 to the present. 
Constrained Discretion: Making Discretion More Rule-Like
The arguments above argue against adoption of an instrument rule for monetary policy.
However, we have also seen that pure discretion can lead to high inflation. But is there something in between? Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) argue that the rules-versus-discretion debate has been miscast because the dichotomy between rules and discretion is too simple. Advocates of rules argue against pure discretion which is subject to the time-inconsistency problem, while advocates of discretion argue against rigid rules. Bernanke and I argued that by imposing a structure that imposes discipline on monetary policy, but does not eliminate flexibility, what we called constrained discretion, monetary policy could avoid some of the disadvantages of either rigid rules or pure discretion. Another way of thinking about constrained discretion is that it is an attempt to achieve the best of both worlds of rules and discretion by making discretion have rule-like properties, so that it avoids the time-inconsistency problem.
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HOW CAN MONETARY POLICY DISCRETION BE MADE MORE RULE-LIKE?
Constrained discretion as an approach to the conduct of monetary policy can help stabilize output and inflation, but there is still the question of how a framework of constrained discretion can be designed so that it is rule-like, and so avoids the time-inconsistency problem.
A first step in making monetary policy discretion more rule-like is for the monetary authorities to constrain discretion to avoid the time inconsistency problem by adopting a nominal anchor and being accountable to not deviate very far from it. However, higher accountability of monetary policy to achieve the nominal anchor can be enhanced by communication of the monetary policy reaction process.
Let's look at each in turn.
Adoption of a Nominal Anchor
An increasingly popular approach to adopting a nominal anchor and being accountable to not deviate from it is inflation targeting. As emphasized in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , Bernanke, et. al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999) , inflation targeting is a form of constrained discretion that can avoid the time-inconsistency problem by not only announcing an inflation target, but also by being accountable to achieve the target through communication about how the target is to be achieved and how past policy actions were consistent with achieving the inflation target. Other similar approaches adopt other target criteria with a nominal anchor such as pricelevel targeting or nominal GDP targeting, or alternatively, as in Woodford (2003), a target criterion that involves a tradeoff between output gaps and inflation gaps. These approaches are sometimes referred to as target rules. This is because they have rule-like properties that allow them to mitigate the time-inconsistency problem. However, these approaches are not rules in the sense that they provide an automatic prescription for how monetary policy is conducted. Instead they allow a lot of discretion on the part of monetary policymakers, including a lot of judgement as to how monetary policy instruments are set to achieve the target criterion.
It should also be pointed out that even if monetary policy makers do not explicitly adopt a nominal anchor by announcing a target for a nominal variable, they may do nearly as well by implicitly adopting a nominal anchor. For example, until January 2012, when the Federal Reserve adopted a 2% inflation target, the Federal Reserve did not have an explicit nominal anchor. Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve did emphasize that price stability was its most important long-term objective and expected inflation did become reasonably well-anchored both before and immediately after the global financial crisis. Indeed, one of the great successes of the Bernanke-Fed before 2012 was that it was able to anchor inflation expectations during the financial crisis through highly active, discretionary actions that prevented inflation expectations from plummeting, as they did in Japan. When I was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, I nonetheless argued that adopting an explicit inflation target would help stabilize output and inflation relative to the Fed's monetary policy strategy at the time because it would make it more likely that inflation expectations would be anchored in the future (Mishkin, 2008b) .
Advocates of instrument rules criticize inflation targeting for being too discretionary. I
do not want to go into great detail as to how inflation targeting or its variants can constrain discretion to ensure that monetary policymakers are less tempted to renege on optimal plans. This is well-covered territory. The evidence, however, does support that countries that have adopted inflation targeting have been able to anchor inflation expectations well (Gürkaynak, et. al, 2010) , which only occurs if this strategy is rule-like and overcomes the time-inconsistency problem. Furthermore, countries that have adopted inflation targeting have had inflation that is low and stable without bearing the cost of larger fluctuations of output (Mishkin and SchmidtHebbel, 2002 
Communicating a Monetary Policy Reaction Process
Although adopting a nominal anchor such as an inflation target can go a long way to constraining discretion and making it rule-like, it might not create enough accountability to constrain discretion sufficiently; the long lags from monetary policy to inflation mean that it may be several years before the monetary policy authorities can be monitored to see whether they took appropriate steps to achieve the target. Indeed, I suspect that this is why advocates of instrument rules do not feel that inflation targeting is sufficiently rule-like and that adoption of a rule would provide more stable inflation and output outcomes.
This concern that just announcing a nominal anchor is not sufficient to stabilize inflation can be addressed by improving the use of discretion with more communication about the monetary policy reaction process, that is, how monetary policy instruments would change as economic circumstances change. (Note that I use the term monetary reaction process rather than monetary policy reaction function. A function is a mathematical construct that generates an output from quantifiable inputs. Since, as I argue later, judgement requires that not all inputs into monetary policy decisions have to be quantifiable. Thus a description of monetary policy reactions to evolving economic circumstances is better described as a reaction process rather than a reaction function.) If the markets and the public have a better understanding of the policy reaction process, they can evaluate whether the setting of the policy instruments is consistent with achieving the nominal anchor target, thus increasing the accountability of the monetary policy authorities for achieving this target.
It is true that the markets can glean some information about the policy reaction process by seeing how actual monetary policy actions react to the incoming data, as the evidence presented below indicates. However, the monetary authorities can provide even more information about their policy reaction process and increase accountability by communicating 19 how the policy instruments would change as economic circumstances change and then explaining how the current setting of their policy instruments is consistent with this policy reaction process. Then as the economy evolves, the public and the markets can assess whether monetary policy is trying to achieve the nominal anchor, even before the outcomes on this anchor are revealed. However, communication about the policy reaction process can be increased by the use of what Feroli et. al. (2017) refer to as data-based forward guidance: that is, providing information on the future path of the policy rate conditional on the data that could occur over the policy horizon. This form of data-based forward guidance would not only make it easier for the public and the markets to evaluate whether the actual setting of policy instruments is consistent with the 20 objective of hitting the nominal anchor target, but also has expectations dynamics that can help stabilize output and inflation.
To see why data-based forward guidance leads to expectations dynamics that stabilize inflation and output, consider a negative shock to aggregate demand when both the inflation gap and output gap are at zero. The result would be that both the inflation and output gaps would turn negative in the future and an monetary policy reaction process that minimizes output and inflation gaps would indicate that the federal funds rate path would be lowered. However, forward guidance is often not done in a data-based way. As described in Feroli et. al. (2017) the Federal Reserve has often engaged in a second type of forward guidance, timebased forward guidance, in which a central bank commits to set the policy rate at specific levels at specific calendar dates. An extreme version of time-based forward guidance would be a central bank committing not to raise interest rates from their current level for several years. Such a commitment would ignore incoming information, which is why the forward guidance is time-
based.
Not only does this time-based forward guidance provide less information about the policy reaction process so that there is less accountability of the central bank to meet its nominal anchor objectives, but it results in expectations dynamics that destabilize output and inflation. Again consider the situation in which the positive employment report leads to expectations that inflation will be higher than previously expected. With time-dependent forward guidance, the projected policy path does not change, but expected inflation rises. This means that the expected path of future real interest rates, policy interest rates minus expected inflation, now declines. The 21 effect of the positive employment report shock is then an effective easing of monetary policy, the opposite to the monetary policy response that would stabilize output and inflation.
This feature of time-dependent forward guidance is exactly the same problem created by the zero lower bound for the policy rate, as discussed in Eggertson and Woodford (2003) . They point out that when there is a negative aggregate demand shock and the policy rate is at the zero lower bound, then a negative aggregate demand shock leads to a decline in expected inflation and therefore a rise in real interest rates, which further weakens aggregate demand. Negative aggregate demand shocks when the zero lower bound is binding therefore can lead to prolonged economic downturns. Time-dependent forward guidance creates a similar problem because, just as occurs when the policy rate is at the zero lower bound, a negative aggregate demand shock leaves the projected future path of the policy rate unchanged, so that real interest rates rise, thereby propagating the negative aggregate demand shock further.
Does empirical evidence support the theory that time-based forward guidance leads to bad expectation dynamics because it leads to interest rates becoming insensitive to macroeconomic news ? Feroli et. al. (2017) find that the answer is yes. Using the methodology developed by Swanson and Williams (2014) , they evaluate how responsive interest rates were to economics news during periods when the Federal Reserve used time-based forward guidance, data-based forward guidance or no forward guidance at all. Chart 3.3 from Feroli et. al. (2017) reproduced as Figure 2 below shows the sensitivity of Treasury bond rates to macroeconomic news when there is no forward guidance, data-based forward guidance, or time-based forward guidance. As the figure shows, time-based forward guidance is associated with lower sensitivity of interest rates to macroeconomic news at all of the maturities they examine. Time-based forward guidance not only leads to less sensitivity to macroeconomic news than does data-based forward guidance, but also less than when there is no forward guidance at all. Indeed, the results in Feroli et. al. (2017) indicate that, even without forward guidance, markets are able to glean some information about the monetary policy reaction process, which does not occur with timebased forward guidance. Note that the results in Figure 2 are not driven by the zero-lower bound constraint during the post Great-Recession period. Even excluding the zero lower bound period, the sensitivity of interest rates to macroeconomic news is lower during periods in which FOMC communication on forward guidance is more strongly time-dependent.
Why Communicating a Monetary Policy Reaction Process is Not an Instrument Rule
There is an important subtle issue about the benefits of a central bank communicating a monetary policy reaction process. At first glance, a monetary policy reaction process appears to be very similar to instrument rule like the Taylor rule. After all, a Taylor rule is a very simple way of specifying a monetary policy reaction process. So why is data-based forward guidance 23 very different from adoption of an instrument rule, such as a Taylor rule. The answer is that monetary policy that minimizes output and inflation gaps results in a policy reaction process to change over time, either as monetary policymakers learn more about how the economy works or when the structure of the economy changes. Furthermore, monetary policy that minimizes output and inflation gaps leads to a modification of the policy reaction process when there are unforeseen contingencies that were previously not part of the reaction process. Judgement is also a feature of such as policy as demonstrated by Svensson (2005) and would then be part of a monetary policy reaction process. A Taylor rule, which does not change over time, can therefore be far from a policy that minimizes output and inflation gaps.
Unlike a Taylor process, longer-term interest rates would have fallen more rapidly in response to news that the financial disruption was getting worse. This would have helped monetary policy to be even more 24 expansionary than it otherwise would have been, by helping offset some of the negative shocks to the economy from the ongoing financial crisis.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have argued that the rules versus discretion debate is miscast because monetary policy does not have to choose only between adopting a policy instrument rule or pure discretion, both of which have serious shortcomings. Instrument rules can lead to poor economic outcomes if the model of the economy is not reliable or the structure of the economy is unstable, or because rules cannot foresee every contingency or allow judgement. Pure discretion can lead to policies that destabilize inflation and output and is subject to the time-inconsistency problem where there monetary policy reneges on the long-run plan that minimizes output and inflation gaps. Instead of making the stark choice between an instrument rule and pure discretion, another choice is to constrain discretion and make it more rule-like. But how can discretion be constrained and be accountable to be rule-like? I argue that monetary policy discretion can be made more rule-like by 1) adopting a nominal anchor such as an inflation target, a monetary policy strategy that has proved to be very successful at stabilizing inflation and output in recent years, and 2) communication of a monetary policy reaction process, especially through databased forward guidance, in which the monetary policy authorities describe how the future policy path will change as economic circumstances change.
